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I.  Introduction
The used car market has been growing rapidly, because of fleet sales, leasing,
improved reliability of used vehicles, and other related phenomena.  (See, for example,
“Stigma gone, used vehicles defy the system,” Advertising Age 68(14) S2, April 7, 1997.)
The growth of the secondhand market, together with increases in car longevity (Hamilton
and Macauley, 1998), has affected the market for new automobiles.  Used goods compete
with new goods, and the secondhand market is an important factor in the market for
durables.
A used durable is often traded for one of three reasons.  First, owners may sell if
the good they acquired is of inferior quality.  Akerlof (1970) models the adverse selection
problem that results when only the owner knows whether quality is substandard in his
famous “lemons” paper.  He shows that the secondhand market could shut down because
of adverse selection.  Hendel and Lizzeri (1997) examine the effects of adverse selection in
a framework similar to ours.  They argue that “an undesirable feature of Akerlof style
models of adverse selection is that ownership of used cars is independent of preferences,
and therefore ad hoc. … We show that … the used market never shuts down and that the
volume of trade can be quite substantial even in cases with severe informational
asymmetries. … We show that unreliable car brands have steeper price declines and lower
volumes of trade.” (p. i)
Second, there may be exogenous changes in owners’ preferences that reduce their
demand for the product.  Bulow (1982, p. 318) provides the following example:
“...consider the demand for baby carriages.  In 1954 my parents had a high demand for
one unit.  In the current period their demand is zero, while someone else is doing the
demanding. ...  If the demanders remained the same each period, there would be no need
for secondhand transactions.”
We consider a third reason in this paper.  Transactions may occur because the
quality of a durable deteriorates over time, so that current owners sell in order to update
to their preferred quality.  Bond (1982) notes that the quality or quantity of the services a2
durable good provides may deteriorate with age.  Alternatively, either the level of required
maintenance or the probability of failure may increase.  Many used car sales appear to
arise from this consideration, in which the deterioration in a car’s perceived quality is
common knowledge.  For example, some consumers trade in their cars at regular intervals,
such as every three years.  However, this motive for trade is often ignored in models of
secondhand markets that focus on the first two motives.
We model a durable good market where perceived depreciation of the used good
induces transactions.  Our model incorporates vertical differentiation into a standard
durable good model in which the quality of the durable good deteriorates as it ages.  A
monopolist sells durables to a succession of overlapping generations of heterogeneous
consumers, who differ in their willingness to pay for the services provided by the durable
good.  We assume consumers have complete information concerning quality changes over
time.  A motive for secondhand trade arises from the heterogeneity in preferences rather
than random quality.  Transaction costs associated with secondhand sales play a role in the
consumers’ decisions.  Each period, consumers assess the quality of the durable they own.
If the gain in utility from updating their holdings, net of prices, exceeds transaction costs,
consumers sell their used goods in the secondhand market and replace them with durables
of the preferred quality.  Related models of durable goods markets with heterogeneous
consumers and known depreciation (or quality improvement) across vintages are
considered by Fudenberg and Tirole (1998), Hendel and Lizzeri (1997) and Waldman
(1993, 1996).  Hendel and Lizzeri discuss a model with two durable products that yields
comparative statics predictions similar to the results we obtain.
The difference between trade due to changes in consumers’ preferences and trade
occurring because the good changes may seem minor, as may the distinction between
known and random (but privately observed by the owner) changes in the quality of the
good.  However, the three motives for trade have different predictions concerning patterns
of trade in durable markets.  We show that under our assumptions car models that
depreciate relatively quickly have steeper price declines, but higher volumes of trade,
because the potential gains from trade between heterogeneous consumers are greater.3
This predicted pattern is opposite to that of the adverse selection model of Hendel and
Lizzeri (1997), as described above.
Some used car models are relatively poor substitutes for new models, and prices in
the secondhand market reflect this information.  We exploit differences across model/years
in price declines over time.  We examine vehicle title transfers recorded by the Illinois
Secretary of State, price data from the National Auto Dealers Association, and quality
data from Consumer Reports.  Ownership transfers for more than 104,000 passenger cars
and pick-up trucks in Illinois from model years 1986, 1987 and 1988 are traced from the
dealer's lot to the titleholders on December 15, 1994.  Quality, intensity of use (odometer
miles) and manufacturer specific effects are controlled for.  The predictions of our model
are confirmed by the data.  We find that the rate of decline of a used car model’s prices is
negatively and significantly correlated with the length of ownership tenure, or with the
likelihood that the original owner does not sell the vehicle before the end of the sample
period.  There are also significant manufacturer, mileage, and quality effects on ownership
tenure.
The used market performs a valuable function for consumers and the
manufacturer.  The availability of low quality, low price goods permits low valuation
consumers who would otherwise not participate in the market to own the good, albeit
perhaps a clunker.  A market for used goods permits higher valuation consumers to trade
in their older vehicle for a newer one.  If the secondhand market did not exist, these
consumers might instead scrap their used car, or refrain from trade and hold their vehicle
for a longer period.  The used market allows high valuation consumers to maintain
ownership of their preferred vintage or quality.
A manufacturer of new durables will benefit from the used market in several ways.
(Varian (1997) makes this point in a model of a market for information goods.)  The
number of units sold increases because low valuation consumers who would not purchase
otherwise buy used goods.  Low quality durables are traded in the secondhand market that
the firm might not be able to supply economically.  An extreme example is an old car that4
sells for a few hundred dollars.  The manufacturer is probably unable to produce a new
good that cheaply, as the vehicle sells for little more than its scrap value.  The more
efficient the secondhand market, the higher the trade-in value of used cars, and the more
likely older cars can be acquired by low valuation consumers at low cost.  Finally, without
a used car market, the firm would be tempted to lower price and sell to the lower
valuation consumers.  A monopolist of durable goods faces competition in the current
period from past and expected future production.  Coase (1972) conjectures that if a
monopolist cannot credibly commit to future production levels, it would price at marginal
cost.  Such a firm may want to promote a secondhand market that is as frictionless as
possible.1  Bond and Samuelson (1984) consider a Coasian pricing model where the
durable has a finite lifetime and consumers make replacement purchases.  They assume
consumers are homogeneous, and so there is no role for secondhand markets.
Benjamin and Kormendi (1974) argue that a monopolist can maintain market
power, despite an inability to commit to future production, by restricting the used market.
Liebowitz (1982) considers a two period model with independent and unequal first and
second period demands.  He argues that unequal demand is the “key to the paradox” (p.
820) and that in this case a monopolist benefits from an unrestricted used market.  Miller
(1974) uses the used textbook market as an example and obtains the opposite result.  In a
two period model with constant returns to scale in production, he finds no support for the
belief that textbook publishers rush out new editions in order to solve the “problem” and
reduce secondhand sales.  A limitation of the approach taken by Benjamin and Kormendi,
Liebowitz, and Miller is that in their models consumers do not choose between new and
used goods in the same period.  The coexistence of new and used goods in the market is
essential to the consumer decision process that we consider.
One of our goals is to quantify patterns of trade in durable markets.  Bond (1983)
tests whether trade in used trucks can be explained by heterogeneity in firm cost functions.
                                               
1 See, for example, “Ford Buys a Used Car Concept,” Business Week, 3506, December 16, 1996.5
Large firms face higher labor costs but are able to obtain lower interest rates.  Hence,
maintenance of older vehicles is more expensive for large firms than for small firms with
lower labor costs.  Bond considers a static model in which the manufacturer does not
choose price.  Bond’s empirical work compares new and used durables.  In our model,
quality varies with the age of the durable, the model nameplate and the manufacturer.
Bond (1982) does not find evidence of adverse selection, and he conjectures that
institutions have developed to verify quality, as Akerlof suggested.  In contrast, Genesove
(1992) finds some evidence of adverse selection in wholesale automobile auctions, where
interdealer trading occurs.
Purohit (1992) studies changes in used car prices as a function of innovations in
the market for new automobiles.  He finds that when a model is discontinued, or when the
manufacturer extensively redesigns a model, the corresponding used prices fall more than
would be otherwise expected.
The paper proceeds as follows.  In section II we describe the model and some
testable predictions.  The data set is described section III.   Empirical results are presented
in section IV, and we conclude in section V.
II.  A Simple Model
In this section, we describe a simple discrete time model of equilibrium in a
secondhand market for a durable good.  We begin with a frictionless environment in which
every durable good is traded in every period.  We then introduce transaction costs in the
secondhand market that are borne by the seller, and describe how the pattern of trade
differs across durable goods with varying degrees of depreciation.  We consider a model
with a single infinitely lived firm and a succession of overlapping generations of two-
period lived consumers.  The durable good also lasts for two periods.  Consumers value
the durable good for the flow of services the good provides during its life, as in Hirshleifer
(1971).  If the service flow diminishes over time, the used durable good is an imperfect
substitute for a new good.  The service flow, the benefit from using the durable, includes6
both physical output (transportation or production) and other less tangible benefits that
often decline with age (such as reliability, new technology, and the envy of neighbors).
One common modeling assumption concerning a durable’s flow of services is that
of one hoss shay: an L period lived durable is a perfect substitute for a new good through
its useful life, but in period L+1 the good falls apart and becomes useless.2  One hoss shay
is a convenient modeling assumption, but it assumes away a potential motive for trade in
durables in that quality is independent of age.  Another necessary condition for trade in
used durables is consumer heterogeneity in willingness to pay for quality.  Under these
conditions, secondhand trade is an integral part of a vertically differentiated product
market.  The used market permits consumers of heterogeneous preferences for quality to
update to their preferred vintage by selling an older good and buying a newer model.
II.1.  A Model Without Transaction Costs
We first present a model without transaction costs.  The effects of transaction
costs in the secondhand market are studied in Section II.2.
The durable good provides a flow of services for two periods, in the amounts s1
and s2 in the first and second periods of its life.  The good has no scrap value, and
scrappage is assumed to be costless.  We normalize s1 and s2 to fix the discounted flow of
services, given a discount factor b:
s1 + bs2 = 1.
If new goods are preferred to used, s1 > s2.3  If the used good is a perfect substitute for the
                                               
2 The term is from The Deacon’s Masterpiece by Oliver Wendell Holmes:
Have you heard of the wonderful one hoss shay
That was built in such a logical way
It ran a hundred years to the day?
And then of a sudden -- ah, but stay, …
3 There is no loss of generality in this assumption.  If s2 > s1, the analysis could proceed with the names
reversed.  In that case high valuation consumers would specialize in the used good.  Low valuation
consumers would buy the good new and “break it in”.7
new, then s1 = s2; this case of perfect substitutes is the “One Hoss Shay” assumption.  At
the other extreme, if the good is a consumption good the used durable is worthless,
implying s1=1 and s2=0.
The Firm’s Maximization Problem
A monopolist produces at each date a durable good that has a useful life of two
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where P1,t and Qt are the price and quantity of the new good in period t, c is the constant
marginal cost, and b is the firm’s discount factor.  The market price of a used good in the
second of period of its life at time t is denoted P2,t.  A three period old good is worthless,
and hence P3,t is zero.  We assume markets clear and no valuable goods are scrapped.
Therefore, the quantity of used goods available at time t is Qt-1.  Given a production
sequence Qt for all t, market equilibrium will imply a sequence of new and used prices, P1,t
and P2,t for all t.  In order to solve for the market clearing price sequence, we must
describe the problem facing consumers.
Consumers’ Preferences and Market Clearing
Assume that each period a cohort of two period lived consumers enters the
market.  The cohort that enters the market in period t is said to be active in periods t and
t+1.  Consumers discount at the same rate as the firm.  Consumer heterogeneity within a
cohort is captured by q, the marginal willingness to pay for quality, which is distributed
uniformly over [0, Q] with density 1/2.  The total number of active consumers in any
period is Q.  An active consumer of type q derives net utility from a durable of vintage i in
period t as follows:
u(i, q, t) = qsi – (Pi,t - bPi+1,t+1).
Here Pi,t - bPi+1,t+1 is the implicit rental price of using a durable of vintage i, namely the
price of the good today less the present value of its resale price next period.  We8
normalize utility so consumers derive zero net utility if they decide to stay out of the
market.  A consumer in cohort t chooses a durable vintage each period to maximize the
present value of utility across the two periods in which he or she is active:
u(it, q, t) + b u(it+1, q, t+1).
Consumers implicitly have quasi-linear utility, which depends on the discounted service
flows from durable consumption and on end of life wealth.
Optimal consumer choices in any given period fall into one of three categories.
High valuation consumers buy a new durable, intermediate valuation consumers buy used
durables, and low valuation consumers do not participate in the market, as depicted in
Figure 1.  We assume that quantities and prices are such that each set of consumers is
non-empty.  A consumer who buys a durable good of a given vintage must obtain higher
net utility than under the alternatives.  Absent market frictions or borrowing constraints,
consumers face a static optimization problem each period they are in the market, and
optimal behavior in a given period is the same function of their type for both active
cohorts of consumers.
Denote the consumer indifferent between new and used goods at time t by q1,t.
For this marginal consumer, the following incentive compatibility constraint holds:
q1,ts1 - (P1,t - bP2,t+1) =  q1,ts2 - P2,t
The consumer compares the gain in utility from consuming a new good to the higher price,
net of the discounted resale value of the new good.  We assume that consumers have
perfect foresight with respect to future prices.
Denote the consumer indifferent between buying a used good and not participating
in the market at time t by q2,t.  For this consumer, a participation constraint binds:
q2,ts2 - P2,t  =  0.    
Given these two constraints and assuming market clearing, the quantity of goods in
the market can be expressed as a function of the maximum reservation value, Q, and the
identity of the marginal consumers.  Consumers with preference types in the interval [q1,t ,9
Q] purchase the new good.  Similarly, consumers in the interval [q2,t , q1,t) purchase used
goods.  Therefore, market clearing in new goods at time t and used goods at time t+1
implies, for every period t,
Qt =  Q - q1,t  =  q1,t+1 - q2,t+1.
Profit Maximizing Production
The first step in solving the firm’s maximization problem is to derive the inverse
demand curve.  By substituting the expressions for the marginal consumers into the market
clearing condition, we can express inverse demand as:
P1,t = Q - Qt - s2Qt-1 - bs2Qt+1 .
The price of a new good is a function of the quantity of used goods on the market, Qt-1,
and how much is produced next period, Qt+1.  The larger the number of used goods on the
market, the lower the price of used goods, and the less consumers are willing to pay for a
new good.  The more the firm produces next period, the lower will be the price of new
and used goods next period, and hence the lower the resale price of a current new good
when it becomes used next period.  Therefore, the higher next period production, the
higher the implicit rental price of a new good this period, and the less consumers are
willing to pay for new goods this period.
We can now describe the steady state solution to the firm’s maximization problem,
under the assumption that it can commit to a sequence of outputs.  If the firm cannot
commit, the steady state solution has similar comparative statics properties, but there is
more production each period.
When there are no transaction costs, the steady state solution to the firm’s
maximization problem is to produce the quantity
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These expressions follow from the first order conditions with respect to Qt.  The steady
state Q* is obtained from the first order condition, evaluated where Qt equals Q* for all t.
In the case of one hoss shay, there are multiple steady states.  For example, the firm could
produce 2Q* every other period, and nothing in the remaining periods.  However,
whenever a used good is an imperfect substitute for a new good, so that s2 < s1, the unique
steady state entails producing Q* every period.
Note that, given the normalization of discounted service flows, steady state profits
are a decreasing function of s2.  The monopolist prefers that the durable deteriorates
quickly, or that new and used goods are relatively imperfect substitutes.
II.2.  A Model with Transaction Costs
In the previous section we showed that when there are no transaction costs,
consumers face a static optimization problem each period.  In the steady state, Q*
consumers “update” by purchasing a new good each period, and on the other side of the
market Q* consumers purchase used goods.  However, transaction costs are a part of any
secondhand market.  We assume that a transaction cost T must be borne by the seller of a
used good.  For example, a seller might have to place a newspaper advertisement, pay to
have the quality of the used durable certified, or trade in the durable to a dealer at the
wholesale price.
In the presence of transaction costs, consumers who buy a new good when they
are young do not necessarily sell it at the end of the period.  Some consumers are better
off holding the good for its entire useful life.  We now derive comparative statics
predictions concerning the volume of trade in used durables in the presence of this kind of
market friction.11
Assume that in a secondhand transaction a cost T is borne by the seller.  Each
cohort of consumers again has preferences distributed uniformly over [0, Q] with density
½.  Since two cohorts are active any time, the total number of consumers remains Q, but it
is important to distinguish between the behavior of the two active cohorts.  The other
modeling assumptions remain the same.
Under these assumptions, consumers will segment into four groups.  Some buy a
new durable each period and sell them on the used market, some buy a new durable and
keep it for two periods, some buy a used good each period, and some do not participate in
the market, as shown in Figure 2.  Denote the consumers in cohort t who are indifferent








Consider a consumer in the cohort that appears in period t.  The net utility from
buying a new durable each period is given by:
(1+b)qs1 - P1,t - bP1,t+1 + bP2,t+1 + b
2P2,t+2 – b(1+b)T.
This consumer receives the discounted service flow from having a new car in each period
and pays the new car price each period, but recoups the next period used car price net of
transaction costs.
The net utility from buying a durable in period t and keeping it in period t+1 is not
affected directly by transaction costs:
q s1 - P1,t + b q s2.
Thus the marginal consumer 
~
q 1,t, who buys a new car in period t and is indifferent
between holding it for another period versus selling it and buying another new car, is
defined implicitly by:
 qs1 - P1,t+1 + P2,t+1 + bP2,t+2 – (1+b)T =  qs2.12
The net utility from buying a used durable each period remains the same as before.
The identity of the marginal consumer 
~
q 3,t, who is indifferent between buying a
used good in period t and staying out of the market, is given by the participation constraint
in the model without transaction costs.  This marginal consumer is the same for both
active cohorts.
Finally, the marginal consumer 
~
q 2,t, who is indifferent between buying a new car in
period t and keeping it for two periods, as opposed to buying a used car each period, is
given by:
qs1 - P1,t  =  qs2 - P2,t - bP2,t+1.
This consumer compares the gain in service flows in the first period to the difference
between buying a new durable in period t and buying a used good each period.
In period t, new goods are bought by old consumers on the interval [
~
q 1,t-1 , Q],
and by young consumers on [
~






















Used goods in period t are held by old consumers on [
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When there are transaction costs T in the used market borne by the seller, the
inverse demand curve for the firm will be:
P1,t = Q - Qt - s2Qt-1 - bs2Qt+1 – (1+b)T/2.13
For the manufacturer, the presence of the transaction costs T in the used market is
equivalent to an increase in its marginal cost by (1+b)T/2.  In this sense, the manufacturer
prefers that the used market be as frictionless as possible.
The number of used cars that are held by their original owners in period t is given
by (
~
q 1,t-1 - 
~
q 2,t)/2, which in steady state equals:
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This measure is inversely related to the volume of trade in the second hand market.  The
greater the degree of imperfect substitutability between new and used durables, as
reflected by the difference D = s1 – s2, the greater is the volume of secondhand trade.
Recall that steady state output is a decreasing function of s2, given our normalization that
discounted service flows sum to one, and hence an increasing function of the difference D.
Therefore both the number and the fraction of new cars that are held by their original
owner are decreasing in this difference.  The greater the difference in service flows, the
larger are the potential gains from trade between the heterogeneous consumers, and the
more trade will occur.  In contrast, the larger the transaction costs in the secondhand
market, T, the greater are market frictions, and the lower the volume of trade in used
durables.
The difference D measures the decline in services provided by the durable between
the first and second periods of its life.  If prices reflect the remaining discounted flow of
services, then D will also be a measure of the convexity of the price sequence of the
durable over time.  That is, the greater is D, the greater the difference between new and
used durable prices in equilibrium.  More generally, if a durable lasts longer than two
periods, then its price sequence will be more convex the more rapidly service flows
diminish over time.
In our model, the market clearing price of a used durable in period t is determined
by the participation constraint of consumers who are indifferent between buying a used
good and being out of the market,14
P2,t = s2
~
q 3,t = s2 ( Q - Qt – Qt-1).
Given our previous expression for the price of new goods in period t, we can solve
for the implicit rental price of new durables in period t:
P1,t - b P2,t+1 = s1 ( Q - Qt ) – s2 Qt-1 – (1 + b)T/2.
The rental price is increasing in s1 and decreasing in s2, and so an increasing function of D
= s1 – s2.  Hence, the greater is D, the more convex the price sequence of the durable.  A
convex price sequence will have a relatively high implicit rental price in the first period.
Thus, the model with transaction costs in the secondhand market predicts that
durable goods that retain their value better, in the sense of maintaining a flow of services,
will have a less convex sequence of prices over time, and will trade less often on the
secondhand market.
III.  Data
In order to test the predictions of the model, automobile data from three sources
have been collected.  First, we obtained the title transfer history for individual vehicles
from the Illinois Secretary of State.  Second, average prices of used vehicles were
obtained from the National Automobile Dealers Association.  Finally, reliability data were
obtained from Consumer Reports, which collects repair histories from its reader survey.
Summary statistics are provided at the model/year level in their annual automobile issue.
We now describe the data in more detail.
Ownership History
Title transaction histories provide information on the number and timing of trades
in the used car market.  The unit of observation is an individual vehicle.  The Illinois
Secretary of State (ILSS) provided data on all title transfers for a random sample of
250,000 passenger cars, pickup trucks, and sport utility vehicles in model years 1986
through 1989, inclusive.  The sample period precedes the large scale leasing of new15
vehicles.  The number of titles (OWNERS) and the date of each title transfer are recorded
by the ILSS.  Most vehicles had three or fewer owners in the sample period.  The ILSS
records the most recent 11 title transfers.  The Vehicle Identification Number (VIN) is
reported for each vehicle.  This 17-digit number allows us to code vehicles into 760
model/year categories (approximately 190 per year), and we can follow vehicles across
owners.
Many vehicles in the ILSS’s random sample were eliminated from the data set for
several reasons.  First, we do not observe the initial purchase date if the title was
transferred into the state.  Second, some vehicles had coding errors in ILSS records.
Third, we dropped the 1989 model year in order to have a relatively long price history.
Fourth, some models had an insufficient number of observations, such as Alpha Romeo
and Fiat.  Finally, a sample selection bias exists for a subset of the 1986 vehicles.4  The
remaining sample size is 104,033 vehicles.
The odometer reading at the time of the last transfer (ODOMETER) is also
reported to the ILSS.5  A used car with high mileage should be an inferior substitute for a
new vehicle compared to a car with low mileage.  In order to control for this effect, we
construct expected vehicle mileage, PREDOD, as a function of vintage and vehicle
manufacturer.  The variable ODDIF = ODOMETER – PREDOD is the deviation from
predicted mileage, in thousands of miles.
Table 1 presents some summary statistics for the title history data set.   On
average, vehicles had about two owners in the sample period.  About a quarter of the
vehicles in the sample are pickups, vans or sport utility vehicles, as indicated by the
NOTCAR dummy.  The BUSINESS, SINGLE and MARRIED dummy variables indicate
                                               
4 Title histories on 1986 model year vehicles purchased new before January 1, 1987, were included in the
sample only if there was a subsequent transaction.  Therefore, all 1986 model year vehicles that had an
initial purchase date in 1986 were dropped from the data set.
5 The odometer reading is omitted for some vehicles and reported as zero.  For other vehicles the
odometer may have rolled over.  There is a box on the title transfer form to indicate that the physical
limits of the odometer have been exceeded, but its status is not recorded in the data set.16
whether the original registration was for a business, a single individual, or more than one
person, respectively.
Table 2 displays the distribution of OWNERS, the number of owners, by model
year.  Almost half the vehicles, 46%, were with their original owner at the end of the
sample period.  Very few had more than two title transfers, i.e., more than three owners.
Vehicles in older model years are more likely to have more owners.
Table 3 lists summary statistics for the average number of OWNERS and sample
sizes by manufacturer, where a “manufacturer” is a group of models (and more
disaggregate than actual manufacturers).  Vehicles from manufacturers with reputations
for reliability, such as Acura, Honda, Mercedes, Saab, Toyota and Volvo, had relatively
few title transfers.  In contrast, there are more title transfers on average for AMC,
Cadillac, Jaguar, Lincoln, Merkur, Porsche, Suzuki and Yugo.  We also report the fraction
of vehicles that were sold by the original owner by the end of the sample period.  At this
level, the title transfer data are consistent with the model sketched in section II, which
predicts that cars that depreciate relatively quickly are more likely to be sold by their
original owners.
Price Data
The monthly National Automobile Dealers Association (NADA) price books
provide data that can be used to measure the resale value and substitutability over time of
each model.  NADA publishes 10 regional “Blue Books” (which are orange) monthly.
The Central edition includes all of Illinois, except for one rural county.  NADA generates
average retail prices (RP) from sales reports provided by member dealers.  Average
wholesale prices (WP) are generated from sales reports from auto auctions, as well as
dealer reports.
The reported Retail Price (RP) of a vehicle might be distorted if a trade-in is
involved in the transaction.  Because auto auctions do not have trade-ins associated with
sales, the wholesale prices may be more reliable.  Prices are sampled once per year, in17
December.  The auto sale year begins in September of the previous year, and models are
on the market for 12 to 15 months before the first December observation.  NADA rounds
prices to the nearest $25.  Each model/year pair has at least 7 years of price data.  RPi and
WPi denote the mean retail and wholesale prices, respectively, in the i
th sample year for
each vehicle.  For example, WP3 is the average wholesale price of a three-year-old car.
Prices are normalized by dividing by RP1 and WP1 for each vehicle’s retail and wholesale
price series.6   We denote the normalized price measures as RPERi and WPERi,
respectively.  They capture the fraction of a vehicle’s initial used price that is retained at
age i.
We do not capture the dramatic first year price depreciation experienced by new
cars, since we do not observe the average price of new vehicles.  List prices are available,
but they are unreliable measures of actual transaction prices, as different manufacturers
have different discount and rebate policies.
Transaction costs are estimated as the difference between the retail and wholesale
prices for a four year old vehicle:
TC = (RP4 – WP4).
Log(TC) is the natural logarithm of our measure of transaction costs.  We use year 4
because it falls in the middle of the 7 years of observed prices.
As discussed in section II, in market equilibrium the first difference in price, or the
fraction of value retained, is a function of the service flow from the good.   A measure of
the degree of substitutability is the second difference in the market price, or the first
difference of the service flow.  SUBST measures the convexity of the sequence of
normalized wholesale prices.  The period over which the service flow is measured is three
years.  Hence SUBST = [(WP1 – WP4) – (WP4 – WP7)] /WP1 = 1 – 2WPER4  + WPER7.
                                               
6 79 retail and wholesale prices were missing from a sample of 5,130.  These 79 missing prices were
estimated with a linear approximation that uses sample prices from 6 months and 12 months later.  Let
MP denote the missing price, P6 the price 6 months later, and P12 the price 12 months later.  Then
MP=P6+(P6-P12).18
The higher is SUBST, the more convex is the sequence of wholesale prices, and we infer
that an older vehicle is a relatively poor substitute for its new counterpart.  We use
wholesale prices because they are probably more reliable than retail prices.  However, we
obtain similar empirical results when we use a SUBST measure based on retail prices.
Table 4 presents summary statistics for the NADA wholesale price data.  On
average, prices fall by 2/3 between the end of the first and the seventh year on the market,
as measured by WPER7.  But there is considerable dispersion in this measure, as WPER7
ranges from .03 to .74.  In addition, our measure of the convexity of the price sequence
over time relative to the one-year price, SUBST, also exhibits considerable dispersion.
Quality Data
Quality data permit us to gauge the reliability of a vehicle relative to its peers and
to control for the different rates of physical depreciation.  Consumer Reports collects
survey data on the repair records of vehicles owned by subscribers.  Based on the survey
response, they publish a “Trouble Index” that indicates the reliability of each model/year
over time.  Like SUBST, this index measures whether older vehicles yield relatively high
service flows, in comparison with their service flows when they were new.
Consumer Reports aggregates responses from a questionnaire on automobile
performance in 16 different areas to generate their index.  The Trouble Index is a relative
measure, and reported on a five-point scale.  Consumer Reports sets the cutoffs for the
categories as follows:
Well Above Average: Overall reliability 35% or more above average (denoted WAA =1)
Above Average: Overall reliability 15% to 35% above average (AA = 1)
Average: Overall reliability within 15% of average
Below Average: Between 15% and 35% less than average (BA = 1)
Well Below Average: Overall reliability 35% or less than average (WBA = 1)
Approximately 15 percent of the Trouble Indices for 1987 to 1991 are not reported by
Consumer Reports due to insufficient data.  Half were omitted from the sample due to19
insufficient sample size (e.g., Alfa Romeo and Fiat).  The remaining values were estimated
using an ordered probit based on a manufacturer dummy and the vehicle's age.
Trouble Indices are highly collinear for different ages of a given model/year, as reliable
cars generally remain reliable.  Our empirical results consider only the Trouble Index at
age four.  We report average Trouble Indices by manufacturer in Table 3, where WAA
corresponds to TI = 0, and TI = 4 for WBA model years.
IV.  Empirical Results
Our theoretical model predicts that the more imperfect a substitute a used vehicle
is for a new model, the more trade there should be in the used market.  This section
reports on our tests of this hypothesis, as well as some related results.
We consider three different measures of trade in the used market: the number of
owners (OWNERS), whether the original owner sold the vehicle within the sample period
(TRADED = 1 if OWNERS > 1), and the duration of ownership (DURATION).  In the
tables described below, we first employ a least squares regression where the logarithm of
OWNERS is the dependent variable.  Second, a logistic regression is used to model the
original owner’s decision whether to sell their vehicle in the used market, i.e., whether
TRADED equals one.  Finally, we model the duration of ownership, where we account for
the right censoring of the data for vehicles that are not sold by the end of the sample
period.  For example, an observation is censored if TRADED equals zero.  DURATION is
measured in days.  The duration model assumes a Weibull distribution, which permits us
to interpret the estimated coefficients as either Accelerated Failure Time (AFT) or Hazard
models.
All estimates omit retained value (WPER) due to collinearity with the measure of
substitutability.  Our measure of substitutability, SUBST, is as defined above.  Note that
the unexpected mileage variable ODDIF will be zero for any new car that is not traded
during our sample period, as there is no transaction that requires an odometer reading
report to the ILSS.  As a result, ODDIF is omitted in the TRADED equations.  The20
omitted category of the Consumer Reports Trouble Index is “average”.  The natural
logarithm of the first period wholesale price, WP1, is included to control for the absolute
price level of the car.  SINGLE and BUSINESS are dummy variables that indicate
whether an individual or a business holds the title, respectively.  The omitted category
occurs when two or more individuals hold the title jointly.
The first columns of Table 5 present OLS estimates of the determinants of the
number of OWNERS based on the full sample of all vehicles.  The remaining columns
report results for the subsample of vehicles that had two or more owners.  We consider
this subsample separately, to see whether the first sale of vehicle is distinctive, as might be
predicted by an adverse selection model.  In contrast, if the extent of quality deterioration
is common knowledge, the forces governing the first decision whether and when to sell a
vehicle should be similar to those governing subsequent sales.  A vehicle is included in the
“Purchased Used” subsample if the first owner sold it during the sample period.  Here the
least squares regression equation predicts the number of owners, given that there is more
than one.  The total number of vehicles in this subsample is 56,131.
The estimated coefficient for SUBST is consistent with our model’s predictions
and significant for both samples.  If the pattern of used prices over time is relatively
convex, which we interpret to indicate that a used vehicle is a relatively imperfect
substitute for the same vehicle when purchased new, a vehicle has more owners on
average.
According to the Consumer Reports reliability measures, unreliable vehicles (the
BA and WBA categories) are traded more frequently, whereas reliable vehicles (WAA and
AA) are traded less often.
The results also indicate that vehicles originally registered to a single individual are
traded more often than are those registered to multiple owners, perhaps because we do
not observe vehicle transfers within a family.  Multiple registered owner households may
be more likely to own more than one vehicle.  The coefficient on BUSINESS indicates
that vehicles with business owners are traded less often.21
The coefficient on the pick-up truck, SUV and van dummy, NOTCAR, indicates
that they are traded less frequently than passenger cars.  This is consistent with our model
to the extent that service characteristics such the cargo carrying capacity or the benefits of
four wheel drive, say, do not deteriorate over time.  The log(WP1) coefficient indicates
that expensive cars are also traded less frequently.  This may occur because there is a
correlation between initial price and overall vehicle quality.  The sign on ODDIF is
positive.  High mileage cars are traded more frequently.
One result that is contrary to the predictions of our model is the effect of
transaction costs, log(TC).  Cars with high transaction costs, according to our measure,
are traded more frequently.  However, there appears to be a negative correlation between
transaction costs and vehicle reliability.  Cars that Consumer Reports rates as well above
average or above average in reliability are traded infrequently and also have low
transaction costs.  The reason for the lower transaction costs on reliable vehicles could be
because of lower pre-sale expenses such as inventory and preparation or lower warranty
costs.7
The specification reported in Table 6 reexamines the determinants of the number of
owners by including a complete set of manufacturer dummies in the OLS estimation
procedures.8  This specification focuses on within manufacturer variation.  The SUBST
coefficient is smaller than that in Table 5.  That is, the within-manufacturer effect is
smaller than that between manufacturers, but significant nonetheless.  The ordering of the
manufacturer coefficients is similar to the means reported in Table 3, and some of the
effects are large.  Lincolns have approximately 20% more owners, and Suzukis about
35%.   The other coefficients are similar to their counterparts in Table 5.
The first columns of Tables 7 and 8 present logit results for the determinants of
whether a vehicle is TRADED by the original owner by the end of the sample period.  The
                                               
7Many states require that a dealer offer a 30 or 90-day warranty on used vehicles.
8 The estimated coefficients for each manufacturer are not reported in Table 6.22
second set of columns report the determinants of whether the second owner, who
purchased a used car, sold the vehicle before the end of the sample period (i.e., whether
OWNERS > 2, given that OWNERS > 1).  The regressions in Table 8 include a complete
set of manufacturer dummies, as in Table 6.
The pattern of the coefficients in Tables 7 and 8 are similar to the analogous
coefficients in Tables 5 and 6.
Finally, the first columns of Tables 9 and 10 report results from the duration model
for the entire sample, with and without manufacturer fixed effects, respectively, where the
likelihood function has a separate term for the ownership tenure of the original owner as
well as all subsequent owners.  A vehicle enters the likelihood function for the duration
model multiple times if it was traded more than once, once for each time the car was
traded in the second-hand market and once for the last owner in the sample period.
The second set of columns in tables 9 and 10 considers the determinants of the
length of time the vehicle is held by the original owner, who “Purchased New.”  We again
account for the censoring of those observations where the vehicle had only one owner in
the sample period.  Here each vehicle enters the likelihood function once.
The final set of columns in Tables 9 and 10 report results for the subsample of
owners who acquired a used vehicle.  In this instance, the likelihood function accounts for
the duration of ownership for every titleholder after the original owner.
The coefficients in Tables 9 and 10 are similar to those in the preceding tables.  For
example, if the pattern of used prices over time is relatively convex, as indicated by a high
value of SUBST, a vehicle has more owners, the original owner is more likely to sell, and
the duration of ownership is shorter.
In order to test whether new and used car buyers behave similarly, we test whether
the SUBST coefficients are equivalent for the various specifications.  That is, we test
whether the b b SUBST coefficients are equal for the subsamples of vehicles purchased new
and used.  The test statistics are reported in Table 11.  The hypothesis that the SUBST23
coefficients are equal cannot be rejected for any of the specifications that include
manufacturer fixed effects, nor for the OLS regressions reported in Table 5.  The
hypothesis that the SUBST coefficient is equal for new and used owners can be rejected
for the logit and duration models without manufacturer fixed effects.  Nevertheless, the
determinants of trading activity are quite similar for the various subsamples and
specifications considered.
V. Conclusion
Anecdotal evidence suggests that many transactions in secondhand durable
markets occur when consumers with a relative preference for “newness” sell their older
good in order to update their holdings.  Earlier models of used durable markets have not
emphasized this aspect of secondhand trade.  Instead, the literature has considered trading
patterns when sellers with private information seek to “unload” a good of inferior quality
(Akerlof’s lemons) or when there are exogenous changes in consumers’ preferences
(Bulow’s baby carriage).
We model the market for secondhand durables as a vertically differentiated
product space in which a good provides high quality when it is new and lower quality later
in its life.  Trade in the secondhand market occurs because consumers have heterogeneous
preferences for quality and because the flow of services from a durable good diminishes as
the durable ages.  Our model predicts that vehicles that depreciate relatively quickly, as
reflected by their prices on the used car market, are traded relatively frequently.  This
prediction differs from that of a similar model that emphasizes adverse selection (Hendel
and Lizzeri, 1997).
We test this prediction with a data set that records title transfers for 104,033
vehicles in Illinois over the period from 1986 to 1994.  Our data set also includes average
retail and wholesale prices and quality information.  We employ three different measures
of the volume of secondhand trade: the number of owners, whether individual vehicles are
traded, and the duration of ownership.  The estimated coefficients for SUBST, our
measure of imperfect substitutability between older and new vehicles, are significant and24
have the predicted signs.  The empirical results are robust across our three different
measures of secondhand trade volume.
Our paper offers a different perspective on trade in used durables.  We do not
regard the empirical results as definitive, but they suggest that our model of secondhand
trade has some empirical validity.  Our theoretical analysis does not consider the
possibility of leasing.  If there are moral hazard issues associated with drivers not
exercising proper care, then leasing will not be an attractive alternative for the
manufacturer.  However, in the model years following those in our sample, leasing has
become a widespread phenomenon, and it would be interesting to see how the market for
new and used cars has been affected.
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Summary Statistics of the Illinois Title History Data
Variable Mean Std  Deviation Minimum Maximum
OWNERS 1.922 1.117 1 11
ODDIF -0.064 25.578 -99.2 933.2
NOTCAR 0.231 0.422 0 1
1986 0.023 0.150 0 1
1987 0.444 0.497 0 1
1988 0.532 0.499 0 1
BUSINESS 0.008 0.089 0 1
SINGLE 0.591 0.492 0 1
MARRIED 0.401 0.490 0 1
Table 2
Distribution of Number of Owners by Model Year



























1 1,025 0.426 19,197 0.415 27,680 0.500 47,902 0.460
2 616 0.256 14,303 0.309 15,944 0.288 30,863 0.297
3 419 0.174 7,580 0.164 7,596 0.137 15,595 0.150
4 or 5 301 0.084 4,551 0.072 3,760 0.052 8,612 0.061
6 to 11 46 0.041 600 0.026 415 0.016 1,061 0.021
Total 2,407 1.000 46,231 1.000 55,395 1.000 104,033 1.000Table 3
Summary Statistics by Manufacturer
Manufacturer Observations Mean # of Owners Fraction Traded Average Trouble Index
ACURA 608 1.681 0.461 0.000
AMC 116 2.405 0.672 4.000
AUDI 264 1.920 0.538 1.655
BMW 428 1.874 0.528 1.820
BUICK 5,785 1.879 0.545 2.883
CADILLAC 2,386 2.034 0.618 2.051
CHEVY 20,671 1.940 0.537 2.751
CHRYSLER 2,355 1.966 0.585 2.946
DODGE 6,448 1.887 0.525 2.712
FORD 20,058 1.973 0.558 2.791
GMC 1702 1.826 0.506 3.266
HONDA 3,752 1.678 0.425 0.054
HYUNDAI 922 2.008 0.518 4.000
ISUZU 269 1.914 0.539 1.290
JAGUAR 158 1.975 0.582 3.994
JEEP_EAG 832 2.017 0.565 2.153
LINCOLN 1,693 2.209 0.689 1.967
MAZDA 1,620 1.804 0.473 0.596
MERCEDES 582 1.777 0.483 0.880
MERCURY 4,289 1.932 0.562 2.151
MERKUR 106 2.226 0.642 4.000
MITSUBISHI 426 2.059 0.587 1.031
NISSAN 3,009 1.983 0.540 1.096
OLDS 7,118 1.855 0.534 2.533
PEUGEOT 30 1.900 0.533 4.000
PLYMOUTH 4,343 1.953 0.556 2.308
PONTIAC 6,341 2.028 0.582 3.235
PORSCHE 154 1.903 0.519 2.000
SAAB 253 1.731 0.451 2.328
SUBARU 594 1.714 0.458 1.419
SUZUKI 142 2.676 0.775 0.000
TOYOTA 4,618 1.759 0.464 0.515
VOLVO 601 1.542 0.381 1.418
VW 1,030 1.721 0.448 2.220
YUGO 330 2.188 0.545 4.000
Total 104,033 1.941 0.541 2.173Table 4
Summary Statistics of the N.A.D.A. Wholesale Price Data
Variable Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum
 WP1 9,277 3,823 2,600 51,025
 WP2 8,047 3,496 1,250 46,125
 WP3 6,717 3,011 850 39,950
 WP4 5,565 2,598 625 34,600
 WP5 4,660 2,345 100 30,375
 WP6 3,948 2,234 100 31,250
 WP7 3,090 1,908 100 26,250
WPER1 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000
WPER2 0.862 0.061 0.459 1.169
WPER3 0.718 0.086 0.317 1.042
WPER4 0.591 0.098 0.199 0.890
WPER5 0.491 0.110 0.037 0.839
WPER6 0.412 0.121 0.037 0.785
WPER7 0.330 0.118 0.033 0.740
SUBST 0.148 0.132 -0.223 0.712Table 5
OLS Estimation of the Determinants of the Number of Owners
Without Manufacturer Fixed Effects
Purchased New Purchased Used
Variable Est. Std. Err. Est./S.E. Est. Std. Err. Est./S.E.
Constant 0.1245 0.0602 2.0661 1.0358 0.0482 21.4691
SUBST 0.1715 0.0216 7.9273 0.1452 0.0177 8.1995
Log(WP) -0.1091 0.0154 -7.0633 -0.0897 0.0120 -7.4601
NOTCAR -0.0361 0.0050 -7.2046 -0.0122 0.0040 -3.0335
SINGLE 0.1146 0.0033 35.1356 0.0463 0.0027 16.9343
BUSINESS -0.3550 0.0180 -19.6802 -0.1642 0.0313 -5.2551
1986 0.1673 0.0118 14.1882 0.1269 0.0095 13.3917
1987 0.1100 0.0038 28.7513 0.0447 0.0032 14.1692
log(TC) 0.1719 0.0226 7.6179 0.0893 0.0175 5.0944
WAA -0.0638 0.0056 -11.3072 -0.0118 0.0048 -2.4589
AA -0.0667 0.0066 -10.0405 -0.0266 0.0057 -4.7035
BA 0.0118 0.0043 2.7724 3.01E-4 0.0035 0.0863
WBA 0.0390 0.0044 8.8509 0.0206 0.0036 5.7841




R Squared 0.042 0.019Table 6
OLS Estimation of the Determinants of the Number of Owners
With Manufacturer Fixed Effects
Purchased New Purchased Used
Variable Est. Std. Err. Est./S.E. Est. Std. Err. Est./S.E.
Constant 0.3160 0.0886 3.5682 1.1850 0.0706 16.7933
SUBST 0.1020 0.0270 3.7735 0.0770 0.0219 3.5213
Log(WP) -0.0991 0.0168 -5.8934 -0.0790 0.0131 -6.0480
NOTCAR -0.0387 0.0059 -6.5118 -0.0169 0.0048 -3.5420
SINGLE 0.1138 0.0033 34.9292 0.0452 0.0027 16.5237
BUSINESS -0.3568 0.0181 -19.7603 -0.1669 0.0312 -5.3473
1986 0.1551 0.0126 12.3398 0.1162 0.0101 11.5213
1987 0.1076 0.0041 26.1574 0.0412 0.0034 12.2336
Log(TC) 0.1296 0.0249 5.2008 0.0530 0.0192 2.7646
WAA -0.0352 0.0077 -4.5866 -0.0185 0.0065 -2.8427
AA -0.0524 0.0082 -6.4177 -0.0386 0.0069 -5.6048
BA 0.0115 0.0045 2.5754 -0.0013 0.0037 -0.3431
WBA 0.0354 0.0047 7.5190 0.0165 0.0038




R Squared 0.048 0.023Table 7
Logit Estimation of Whether a Vehicle is Traded
Without Manufacturer Fixed Effects
Purchased New Purchased Used
Variable Est. Std. Err. Est./S.E. Est. Std. Err. Est./S.E.
Constant -2.0181 0.2458 -8.2103 -0.0374 0.3241 -0.1154
SUBST 0.4582 0.0876 5.2306 0.7823 0.1180 6.6297
Log(WP) -0.2860 0.0664 -4.3072 -0.4426 0.0848 -5.2193
NOTCAR -0.1298 0.0206 -6.3010 -0.0632 0.0272 -2.3235
SINGLE 0.4046 0.0129 31.364 0.2649 0.0180 14.717
BUSINESS -1.9658 0.1083 -18.151 -1.3745 0.2814 -4.8845
1986 0.3786 0.0471 8.0382 0.6614 0.0621 10.651
1987 0.3698 0.0152 24.329 0.2300 0.0207 11.111
log(TC) 0.6034 0.0979 6.1634 0.4770 0.1247 3.8252
WAA -0.2584 0.0224 -11.536 -0.0783 0.0316 -2.4778
AA -0.2428 0.0263 -9.2319 -0.1907 0.0375 -5.0853
BA 0.0521 0.0170 3.0647 0.0069 0.0229 0.3017




Log Likelihood -70,360 -38,299Table 8
Logit Estimation of Whether a Vehicle is Traded
With Manufacturer Fixed Effects
Purchased New Purchased Used
Variable Est. Std. Err. Est./S.E. Est. Std. Err. Est./S.E.
Constant -1.5626 0.3632 -4.3023 0.8152 0.4673 1.7445
SUBST 0.3150 0.1103 2.8558 0.3756 0.1443 2.6029
Log(WP) -0.2686 0.0720 -3.7306 -0.3680 0.0875 -4.2057
NOTCAR -0.1269 0.0244 -5.2008 -0.0926 0.0316 -2.9304
SINGLE 0.4071 0.0130 31.315 0.2606 0.0180 14.478
BUSINESS -1.9580 0.1085 -18.046 -1.3908 0.2815 -4.9407
1986 0.3535 0.0505 7.0000 0.5924 0.0664 8.9217
1987 0.3696 0.0165 22.400 0.2080 0.0222 9.3694
log(TC) 0.5093 0.1088 4.6811 0.2530 0.1293 1.9567
WAA -0.1087 0.0306 -3.5523 -0.0792 0.0429 -1.8462
AA -0.1472 0.0327 -4.5015 -0.2460 0.0457 -5.3829
BA 0.0549 0.0179 3.0670 0.0064 0.0241 0.2664




Log Likelihood -70,068 -38,205Table 9
Determinants of the Duration of Ownership
Without Manufacturer Fixed Effects
All Transactions Purchased New Purchased Used
Variable Est. Std. Err. Est./S.E. Est. Std. Err. Est./S.E. Est. Std. Err. Est./S.E.
Constant 5.2256 0.1298 40.2592 6.0556 0.1438 42.1248 3.0266 0.2061 14.6855
SUBST -0.4914 0.0453 -10.8374 -0.3211 0.0508 -6.3188 -0.5340 0.0723 -7.3881
log(WP) 0.2968 0.0349 8.5074 0.2096 0.0399 5.2556 0.2701 0.0504 5.3621
NOTCAR 0.0786 0.0110 7.1623 0.0923 0.0122 7.5514 0.0046 0.0173 0.2679
SINGLE -0.2736 0.0071 -38.7933 -0.2012 0.0077 -26.2124 -0.2953 0.0119 -24.8062
BUSINESS 1.7545 0.0958 18.3090 1.4614 0.0879 16.6310 1.1936 0.2632 4.5355
1986 -0.2376 0.0227 -10.4813 -0.0968 0.0264 -3.6646 -0.2488 0.0352 -7.0717
1987 -0.1139 0.0080 -14.3022 -0.0841 0.0088 -9.5773 -0.0308 0.0132 -2.3250
log(TC) -0.4321 0.0518 -8.3345 -0.4370 0.0591 -7.3966 -0.1331 0.0745 -1.7858
WAA 0.1378 0.0124 11.1404 0.1566 0.0136 11.5353 0.0182 0.0205 0.8881
AA 0.1621 0.0146 11.0859 0.1655 0.0159 10.4190 0.0655 0.0247 2.6566
BA -0.0232 0.0089 -2.6005 -0.0274 0.0098 -2.7928 -0.0040 0.0148 -0.2709
WBA -0.0857 0.0089 -9.6071 -0.0584 0.0100 -5.8691 -0.0874 0.0145 -6.0105
ODDIF -0.0023 7.50E-5 -30.2400 -0.0027 7.60E-5 -35.1763 -3.38E-4 1.54E-4 -2.1948







Log Likelihood -238,125 -128,659 -105,316Table 10
Determinants of the Duration of Ownership
With Manufacturer Fixed Effects
All Transactions Purchased New Purchased Used
Variable Est. Std. Err. Est./S.E. Est. Std. Err. Est./S.E. Est. Std. Err. Est./S.E.
Constant 4.7032 0.1909 24.6430 5.5589 0.2158 25.7641 3.0889 0.2954 10.4575
SUBST -0.2844 0.0575 -4.9480 -0.1897 0.0645 -2.9420 -0.3503 0.0909 -3.8557
Log(WP) 0.2569 0.0381 6.7409 0.1806 0.0439 4.1097 0.2353 0.0548 4.2972
NOTCAR 0.0831 0.0129 6.4172 0.0833 0.0146 5.7176 0.0412 0.0201 2.0494
SINGLE -0.2704 0.0071 -38.3316 -0.1988 0.0077 -25.8792 -0.2914 0.0119 -24.4426
BUSINESS 1.7568 0.0957 18.3553 1.4560 0.0878 16.5803 1.2020 0.2631 4.5691
1986 -0.2010 0.0244 -8.2226 -0.0690 0.0283 -2.4326 -0.2294 0.0381 -6.0236
1987 -0.1051 0.0086 -12.2706 -0.0804 0.0095 -8.4858 -0.0234 0.0141 -1.6552
log(TC) -0.3023 0.0580 -5.2145 -0.3261 0.0670 -4.8659 -0.0888 0.0813 -1.0919
WAA 0.0744 0.0164 4.5305 0.0574 0.0180 3.1919 0.0612 0.0276 2.2161
AA 0.1442 0.0177 8.1645 0.1090 0.0193 5.6568 0.1268 0.0297 4.2680
BA -0.0195 0.0094 -2.0828 -0.0291 0.0103 -2.8209 0.0061 0.0155 0.3912
WBA -0.0751 0.0096 -7.8596 -0.0549 0.0107 -0.0724 0.0155 -4.6616
ODDIF -0.0023 7.40E-5 -30.4405 -0.0026 7.50E-5 -35.1093 -3.40E-4 1.53E-04 -2.2216







Log Likelihood -237,730 -128,331 -105,231Table 11
Test of Equality of SUBST Coefficients for New and Used Vehicles
Without Manufacturer Fixed Effects






Type of Test Wald Likelihood Ratio F-Test
Test Statistic 5.807 4.871 0.669
P-value 0.016 0.027 0.413
With Manufacturer Fixed Effects






Type of Test Wald Likelihood Ratio F-Test
Test Statistic 2.077 0.118 0.395


























Purchase a new car
and keep it for two
periods
Do not
participate